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REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED THEOLOGICAL ETHICS.

By Stephen J. Grabill. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 2006.
Pp. 310. $38.00. ISBN: 0-802-86313-2.
One of the pleasant surprises of the last thirty years has been the
development of increasingly warm relations between American
evangelical and Catholic Christians, and one of the positive
consequences of improved relations has been increased opportunities for
scholarly dialogue between the two traditions. As Mark Noll has
recently argued, evangelical-Catholic engagement enhances Christian
learning because each side needs what the other has to offer:
Evangelicals have tended toward disinterest in history and the material
world and toward disengagement from the wider tradition of Christian
thought, and they have a tendency to over-divide the world into good
and evil.1 Catholics, on the other hand, have sometimes given too much
place to created nature as opposed to divine grace, emphasized
catholicity and tradition to the relative neglect of Scripture, and shown
"too great a willingness to find truth, beauty and goodness spread at
large in the world."2
Noll's assessment is especially apt when it comes to legal
scholarship. In particular, evangelical legal scholarship has suffered
from a lack of connection with the larger Christian tradition.3 One
reason for the disconnection has been that historically, Christian
thinking about law has largely centered around natural law. Thomas
Aquinas' Treatise on Law is arguably the pre-eminent account of natural
law, and evangelicals have tended to be suspicious of both Thomas and
the natural law project. A typical caricature of the "scholastic" St.
Thomas is that his Aristotelianism runs away with his theology,4 and
evangelicals frequently associate the natural law tradition with aspects
of Catholic theology that, in their eyes, neglect the Scriptures in favor of
philosophy and fail to take seriously enough the noetic effects of sin.
1. Mark Noll, Reconsidering Christendom?, in Evangelicalism, Catholicism and the Future

of ChristianLearning (Thomas Albert Howard ed., Baker forthcoming 2007).
2. Id.
3. See generally William Brewbaker, Who Cares? Why Bother?: What Jeff Powell and
Mark Tushnet Have to Say to Each Other, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 533, 551-557 (2002).

4. For acritique of evangelical assessments of Aquinas written by a Protestant, see generally
Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant
Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Christian U. Press 1985).
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Small wonder, then, that the natural law tradition has had limited
influence in evangelical circles.
Stephen Grabill's ambitious, erudite new book intends to change
all that. Indeed, his stated aim is "to assist contemporary Protestant
pastors, denominational officials, theologians, ethicists, public
intellectuals, seminarians, graduate students and general readers to
rediscover and rehabilitate natural law and related doctrinal concepts."
(2) While he is at it, Grabill challenges some important Catholic
misperceptions about Protestant theology as well. More specifically,
Grabill's purposes are to explain why Reformed Protestants are so
skeptical of the natural law tradition and to argue that such skepticism
ought to be seen as an aberration within the historical theology of the
magisterial Reformation. Although it is not an explicit goal of the book
to articulate "a contemporary doctrine of natural law that could be
integrated seamlessly into the larger body of Reformed dogmatics" (17),
Grabill's historical-theological analysis is highly suggestive as to the
form such a doctrine might take.
Karl Barth casts a long shadow in Grabill's book. Although
modem Protestant skepticism about natural law is due in part to the
"anti-scholastic, anti-metaphysical accents of nineteenth-century
German liberal theology," and in part to its association with Roman
Catholic moral theology (4),5 Barth's influential attacks on natural
theology and natural law get the most attention in Grabill's argument.
Specifically, Grabill takes aim at Barth's famous epistemological attack
on natural theology in his 1934 debate with Emil Brunner and at Barth's
"discontinuity thesis"-Barth's claim that "the orthodox Protestant
theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had
unwarrantably converted the Reformers' pastorally oriented and
exegetically based ethics into the abstract scholastic precepts of naturallaw theory."(12) In large measure, the book's argument is organized
around two claims: (i) that Barthian radical epistemological skepticism
is out-of-step with the teaching of the magisterial Reformation, which
has always left room for affirmative (but limited) uses of natural
revelation, natural theology and natural law; and (ii) that there is
substantial intellectual continuity between late medieval philosophical
realists, the early Reformers (including Calvin) and the later "Reformed
scholastics."

5. "Protestant intellectuals... have typically regarded the natural-law tradition to be
doctrinally and philosophically tied to Roman Catholicism, and thus open to the standard
Protestant criticisms that Rome does not take either sin or history seriously enough." (4).
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One of the book's many strengths is the care with which Grabill
defines the terms that have historically marked theological disputation
over natural law. His historical argument begins with the emergence of
nominalism and voluntarism in late medieval theology. Rejecting "[t]he
supposition that Protestant theology and nominalist metaphysics are
fundamentally wedded" (55), he is careful to distinguish between
Occam's nominalism and Scotus's voluntarism.
Although the
Reformers gave priority to the will of God, Grabill argues, the main
contours of Reformed thought are compatible with philosophical
realism, and the Reformers reject the view that God is an arbitrary
legislator. In order to set the stage for the vindication of these claims,
Grabill identifies two main types of natural law theories in late medieval
scholasticism-"a realist theory of natural law, represented by-among
others-Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and a nominalist theory of
natural law, represented by-among others-William of Occam and
Pierre d'Ailly." (57) Significantly, he concludes that "the opposite of a
realist natural-law theory is not necessarily a divine command theory...
but rather a nominalist natural law theory." (57) He also argues that the
dialectic of the two divine powers (God's absolute power vs. God's
ordained power) that preoccupied late medieval theologians "was not
intended to present a theory of divine action but to affirm the contingent
nature of the created order." (64)
Having provided a broad backdrop of the relevant medieval
theological controversies, Grabill next argues, contra Barth, that
Calvin's theology is generally compatible both with some versions of
late-medieval realism and with the theology of the orthodox Reformed
scholastics who came after him. Grabill acknowledges that "Calvin
leaves much unstated about natural law in comparison to his medieval
predecessors' and Reformed successors' treatments of the subject. . .
(91) He nevertheless concludes that
Calvin follows the realist tradition (most likely in its Scotistic
trajectory...) in its affirmation of the ontological status of moral
knowledge..., but differs with it epistemologically, meaning in
the degree to which unaided reason can adequately apprehend
precepts of the natural moral law. (91)
Grabill draws on Calvin's teaching that God can be known as Creator
without being known as Redeemer to preserve a positive place for
natural moral knowledge with respect to civil, social and economic
ordering. (72)
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In the succeeding chapters of the book, Grabill uses the thought of
Peter Martyr Vermigli, Johannes Althusius and Francis Turretin to show
the fundamental continuity between Calvin's thought and that of other
Reformers and, where such continuity is lacking, to question Calvin's
status as "chief codifier" of the Reformation. Vermigli (1499-1562) was
an older contemporary of Calvin's. Grabill (following Richard Muller)
characterizes Vermigli's "formulation... of the knowledge of God as
broadly Thomistic with a strong Augustinian accent." (102) Calvin's
account of natural revelation, on the other hand, departs from that of
both Augustine and Calvin's Protestant contemporaries "by
distinguishing sharply between what is offered to natural reason and
what is received."(1 13)6 Vermigli held that God's natural revelationthough partial and inadequate for salvation-was "perceived by fallen
human beings, who, precisely because of their sinfulness, proceed to
suppress, distort, deny, ignore, forget and abuse what they know." (114) 7
While Calvin did not hold that natural revelation was inevitably and
entirely misperceived, he did not adopt the relatively unproblematic idea
of reception that Vermigli carried over from Augustine. In Grabill's
story, the Thomist-trained Vermigli offers a Reformed account of
natural law that, though still undeveloped, is somewhat more
philosophically sophisticated and optimistic than Calvin's.
Johannes Althusius' (1557-1638) political and legal theory was
developed between the Reformation itself and the period of "high
orthodoxy" emblematized by Francis Turretin. Althusius is, at first
blush, an unusual choice for a book about natural law, because he is best
known for his emphasis on covenant, federalism and Biblical law.
Grabill argues, however, that
for Althusius, like Reformed orthodoxy in general, the moral law
of the Decalogue is simply a renewed and re-enforced form of the
logically prior lex naturalis, the universal knowledge of morality
God originally implanted in the mind at creation, but which after
the fall has become obscure and difficult to discern with precision
and reliability. (132)
In this view, and in his emphasis on the importance of prudence in
making laws for particular societies, Althusius is indebted to the Italian
reformer Jerome Zanchi (1516-90). Grabill argues that Althusius' work

6. The quotation is from David Steinmetz, Calvin in Context 29 (Oxford U. Press 1995).
7. Again quoting Steinmetz, id. at 31.
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can only be properly understood in light of Zanchi's influence,
particularly Zanchi's treatment of the types of law, which was itself
influenced by Aquinas' Treatise on Law. (132-142)
The last figure treated at length in the book is Turretin (1623-87),
whose Institutio theologiae elencticae Grabill regards as "the crowning

achievement of nearly a century and a half of Reformed doctrinal
development." (150) Grabill regards as unfounded the charge that
Turretin's use of the scholastic method is alone enough to place him in
discontinuity with the earlier Reformers. Rather, Turretin maintains
essential theological continuity with the Reformers but methodological
continuity (through scholasticism) with both some Reformers (e.g.,
Vermigli, Zanchi) as well as older scholastics such as Aquinas. (153)
According to Grabill, Turretin finally develops the long-awaited
Reformed doctrine of natural law that "is broadly affirmative of the
realist natural-law tradition (the Thomist and Scotist trajectories)" and
"is systematic and integrated seamlessly with the adjacent doctrines of
natural revelation and natural theology." (154)
As should be clear from the preceding account, Grabill has written
an enormously ambitious book, charting a sophisticated line of argument
that navigates a sea of theological, historical and Biblical disputes. He
does not hesitate to challenge the accepted wisdom of prominent
medievalists, Calvin scholars and theologians of various stripes. No
doubt Grabill's story will itself be challenged by scholars in each of
these disciplines, but its credibility is greatly enhanced by his reliance on
the work of Richard Muller, Heiko Oberman and David Steinmetz, to
name but three significant scholars among many others.
While Grabill's thesis is important in its own right, the book's
significance goes beyond its powerful argument for seeing considerable,
though not complete, continuity between late medieval realists, the
magisterial Reformers and their orthodox successors. Even if Grabill
has not yet offered a contemporary Reformed dogmatics of natural law,
he has more or less traced out the course that must be traversed for that
to take place. In the book's conclusion he has also outlined an important
story waiting to be told about the reasons natural law thinking ceased to
be associated with Protestant theological orthodoxy and came to be seen
as symptomatic of modernity. The book, with its meticulously
documented source material, will be especially valuable to legal scholars
attempting to engage natural law from the perspective of Reformation
theology or to find common ground between Protestant and Catholic
legal thought. Given the current renewal of interest in the relation
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between Christian theology and law, Rediscovering the NaturalLaw in
Reformed Theological Ethics is an important work.
William S. Brewbaker III*

* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

